

## CHAPTER 17

# The geography of class power

*First published in Socialist Register, 1998.*

It is imperative to reignite the political passions that suffuse the *Communist Manifesto*. It is an extraordinary document full of insights, rich in meanings and bursting with political possibilities. While we have not the right, as Marx and Engels wrote in their 1872 preface to the German edition, to alter what has become a key historical document, we have not only the right but the obligation to interpret it in the light of contemporary conditions and historical-geographical experience. '*The practical application of the principles,*' wrote Marx and Engels in that Preface, '*will depend, as the Manifesto itself states everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing.*' This italicized phrase precisely delineates our present task.

The accumulation of capital has always been a profoundly geographical affair. Without the possibilities inherent in geographical expansion, spatial reorganization and uneven geographical development, capitalism would long ago have ceased to function as a political economic system. This perpetual turning to 'a spatial fix' to capitalism's internal contradictions (most notably registered as an overaccumulation of capital within a particular geographical area) coupled with the uneven insertion of different territories and social formations into the capitalist world market has created a global historical geography of capital accumulation whose character needs to be well understood. How Marx and Engels conceptualized the problem in the *Communist Manifesto* deserves some commentary for it is here that the communist movement – with representatives from many countries – came together to try to define a revolutionary agenda that would work in the midst of considerable geographical differentiation. This differentiation is just as important today as it ever was and the *Manifesto*'s weaknesses, as well as its strengths, in its approach to this problem need to be confronted and addressed.

### The spatial fix in Hegel and Marx

In *The Philosophy of Right*, Hegel presented imperialism and colonialism as potential solutions to the internal contradictions of what he considered

to be a 'mature' civil society (Hegel 1967: 150–2). The increasing accumulation of wealth at one pole and the formation of a 'penurious rabble' trapped in the depths of misery and despair at the other, sets the stage for social instability and class war that cannot be cured by any internal transformation (such as a redistribution of wealth from rich to poor). Civil society is thereby driven by its 'inner dialectic' to 'push beyond its own limits and seek markets, and so its necessary means of subsistence, in other lands that are either deficient in the goods it has overproduced, or else generally backward in industry.' It must also found colonies and thereby permit a part of its population 'a return to life on the family basis in a new land' at the same time as it also 'supplies itself with a new demand and field for its industry'. All of this is fuelled by a 'passion for gain' that inevitably involves risk, so that industry, 'instead of remaining rooted to the soil and the limited circle of civil life with its pleasures and desires . . . embraces the element of flux, danger, and destruction.'

Having, in a few brief startling paragraphs, sketched the possibilities of an imperialist and colonial solution to the ever-intensifying internal contradictions of civil society, Hegel just as suddenly dropped the matter. He leaves us in the dark as to whether capitalism could be stabilized by appeal to some sort of 'spatial fix' in either the short or long run. Instead, he turns his attention to the concept of the state as the actuality of the ethical idea. This could be taken to imply that transcendence of civil society's internal contradictions by the modern state – an inner transformation – is both possible and desirable. Yet Hegel nowhere explains how the problems of poverty and of the increasing polarization in the distribution of wealth are actually to be overcome. Are we supposed to believe, then, that these particular problems can be dealt with by imperialism? The text is ambivalent. This is, as Avineri points out, 'the only time in his system, where Hegel raises a problem – and leaves it open' (Avineri 1972: 132).

How far Hegel influenced Marx's later concerns can be endlessly debated. Engels certainly believed that Marx was 'the only one who could undertake the work of extracting from Hegelian logic the kernel containing Hegel's real discoveries.' The language Marx uses to describe the general law of capitalist accumulation, for example, bears an eerie resemblance to

<sup>1</sup> Compare, for example, Hegel's argument in *The Philosophy of Right* that: 'When the standard of living of a large mass of people falls below a certain subsistence level – a level regulated automatically as the one necessary for a member of the society . . . the result is the creation of a rabble of paupers. At the same time this brings with it, at the other end of the social scale, conditions which greatly facilitate the concentration of disproportionate wealth in a few hands,' and Marx's conclusion in *Capital*, Volume I, that: 'as capital accumulates, the situation of the worker, be his payment high or low, must grow

that of Hegel.<sup>1</sup> It is even possible to interpret Volume 1 of *Capital* as a tightly orchestrated argument, buttressed by good deal of historical and material evidence, to prove that the propositions Hegel had so casually advanced, without any logical or evidentiary backing, were indubitably correct.<sup>2</sup> The internal contradictions that Hegel depicted were, in Marx's view, not only inevitable but also incapable of any internal resolution short of proletarian revolution. And this was, of course, the conclusion that Marx wanted to force not only upon the Hegelians but upon everyone else. But in order to make the argument stick, he also has to bear in mind the question that Hegel had raised but left open.

In this light, one other feature in the structure of argument in *Capital* makes sense. The last chapter of the book deals with the question of colonization. It seems, at first sight, an odd afterthought to a work which, in the preceding chapter, announced expropriation of the expropriators and the death-knell of the bourgeoisie with a rhetoric reminiscent of the *Manifesto*. But in the light of Hegel's argument, the chapter acquires a particular significance.

Marx first seeks to show how the bourgeoisie contradicted its own myths as to the origin and nature of capital by the policies it advocated in the colonies. In bourgeois accounts (the paradigmatic case being that of Locke), capital (a thing) originated in the fruitful exercise of the producer's own capacity to labor, while labor power as a commodity arose through a social contract, freely entered into, between those who produced surplus capital through frugality and diligence, and those who chose not to do so. 'This pretty fancy', Marx thunders, is 'torn asunder' in the colonies. As long as the laborer can 'accumulate for himself – and this he can do as long as he remains possessor of his means of production – capitalist accumulation and the capitalist mode of production are impossible.' Capital is not a physical thing but a social relation. It rests on the 'annihilation of self-earned private property, in other words, the expropriation of the labourer.' Historically, this expropriation was 'written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire', and Marx cites chapter, verse and the Duchess of Sutherland to prove his point. The same truth, however, is expressed in colonial land policies, such as those of Wakefield in Australia, in which the powers of private property and the

---

worse . . . It makes an accumulation of misery a necessary condition, corresponding to the accumulation of wealth. Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, the torment of labour, slavery, ignorance, brutalization and moral degradation at the opposite pole, i.e. on the side of the class that produces its own product as capital.' The parallel between the two texts is striking.

<sup>2</sup> See Harvey (1982) ch. 13, Harvey (1981) for further details of this argument.

state were to be used to exclude laborers from easy access to free land in order to preserve a pool of wage laborers for capitalist exploitation. Thus was the bourgeoisie forced to acknowledge in its programme of colonization what it sought to conceal at home: that wage labor and capital are both based on the forcible separation of the laborer from control over the means of production (Marx 1967). This is the secret of 'primitive' or 'original' capital accumulation.

The relation of all this to the question Hegel left open needs explication. If laborers can return to a genuinely unalienated existence through migration overseas or to some frontier region, then capitalist control over labor supply is undermined. Such a form of expansion may be advantageous to labor but it could provide no solution to the inner contradictions of capitalism. The new markets and new fields for industry which Hegel saw as vital could be achieved only through the re-creation of capitalist relations of private property and the associated power to appropriate the labor of others. The fundamental conditions which gave rise to the problem in the first place – alienation of labor – are thereby replicated. Marx's chapter on colonization appears to close off the possibility of any external 'spatial fix' to the internal contradictions of capitalism. Marx evidently felt obliged in *Capital* to close the door that Hegel had left partially ajar and consolidate his call for total revolution by denying that colonization could, in the long run, be a viable solution to the inner contradictions of capital.

But the door will not stay shut. Hegel's 'inner dialectic' undergoes successive representations in Marx's work and at each point the question of the spatial resolution to capitalism's contradictions can legitimately be posed anew. The chapter on colonization may suffice for the first volume of *Capital* where Marx concentrates solely on questions of production. But what of the third volume where Marx shows that the requirements of production conflict with those of circulation to produce crises of overaccumulation? Polarization then takes the form of 'unemployed capital at one pole and unemployed worker population at the other' and the consequent devaluation of both. Can the formation of such crises be contained through geographical expansions and restructurings? Marx does not rule out the possibility that foreign trade and growth of external markets, the export of capital for production, and the expansion of the proletariat through primitive accumulation in other lands, can counteract the falling rate of profit in the short run. But how long is the short run? And if it extends over many generations (as Rosa Luxemburg in her theory of imperialism implied), then what does this do to Marx's theory and its associated political practice of seeking for revolutionary transformations in the heart of civil society in the here and now?

## The spatial dimension to the *Communist Manifesto*

Many of these problems arise in the *Communist Manifesto*.<sup>3</sup> The manner of approach that Marx and Engels took to the problem of uneven geographical development and the spatial fix is in some respects deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, questions of urbanization, geographical transformation and 'globalization' are given a prominent place in the argument, but on the other hand the potential ramifications of geographical restructurings tend to get lost in a rhetorical mode that in the last instance privileges time and history over space and geography.

The opening sentence of the *Manifesto* situates the argument in Europe and it is to that transnational entity and its working classes that its theses are addressed. This reflects the fact that 'Communists of various nationalities' (French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish as well as English are the languages envisaged for publication of the document) were assembled in London to formulate a working-class program. The document is, therefore, Eurocentric rather than international. But the importance of the global setting is not ignored. The revolutionary changes that brought the bourgeoisie to power were connected to 'the discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape' and the opening-up of trade with the colonies and with the East Indian and Chinese markets. The rise of the bourgeoisie is, from the very outset of the argument, intimately connected to its geographical activities and strategies:

Modern industry has established the world market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. This market has given an immense development to commerce to navigation, to communication by land. This development has in turn, reacted on the extension of industry; in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages.

By these geographical means, the bourgeoisie bypassed and suppressed place-bound feudal powers. By these means also the bourgeoisie converted the state (with its military, organizational and fiscal powers) into the executive of its own ambitions. And, once in power, the bourgeoisie continued to pursue its revolutionary mission in part via geographical transformations which are both internal and external. Internally, the creation of great

<sup>3</sup> All citations are from Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist party* Progress Publishers edition, Moscow 1952.

cities and rapid urbanization bring the towns to rule over the country (simultaneously rescuing the latter from the 'idiocy' of rural life and reducing the peasantry to a subaltern class). Urbanization concentrates productive forces as well as labor power in space, transforming scattered populations and decentralized systems of property rights into massive concentrations of political and economic power. 'Nature's forces' are subjected to human control: 'machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground . . .'

But this concentration of the proletariat in factories and towns makes them aware of their common interests. On this basis, they begin to build institutions, such as unions, to articulate their claims. Furthermore, the modern systems of communications put 'the workers of different localities in contact with each other', thus allowing 'the numerous local struggles, all of the same character' to be centralized into 'one national struggle between the classes'. This process, as it spreads across frontiers, strips the workers of 'every trace of national character', for each and everyone of them is subject to the unified rule of capital. The organization of working-class struggle concentrates and diffuses across space in a way that mirrors the actions of capital.

Marx expands on this idea in a passage that is so famous that we are apt to skim over it rather than read and reflect upon it with the care it deserves:

The need for a constantly expanding market chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere . . . The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country . . . All old established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature . . .

If this is not a compelling description of 'globalization' as we now know it, then it is hard to imagine what would be. The traces of Hegel's 'spatial fix' argument are everywhere apparent. But Marx and Engels add something:

The bourgeoisie . . . draws all, even the most barbarian nations into civilization, the cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e. to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.

The theme of the 'civilizing mission' of the bourgeoisie is here enunciated (albeit with a touch of irony). But a certain limit to the power of the spatial fix to work indefinitely and in perpetuity is implied. If the geographical mission of the bourgeoisie is the reproduction of class and productive relations on a progressively expanding geographical scale, then the bases for both the internal contradictions of capitalist and for socialist revolution likewise expand geographically. The conquest of new markets paves the way 'for more extensive and more destructive crises,' while 'diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented'. Class struggle becomes global. Marx and Engels therefore enunciate the imperative 'working men of all countries unite' as a necessary condition for an anti-capitalist and pro-socialist revolution.

### Problematizing the *Manifesto's* geography

The geographical element in the *Manifesto* has, to a large degree, been ignored in subsequent commentaries. When it has been the focus of attention, it has often been treated as unproblematic in relation to political action. This suggests a twofold response as we look back upon the argument. First, it is vital to recognize (as the *Manifesto* so clearly does) the ways in which geographical reorderings and restructurings spatial strategies and geopolitical elements, uneven geographical developments, and the like, are vital aspects to the accumulation of capital, both historically and today. It is likewise vital to recognize (in ways the *Manifesto* tends to underplay) that class struggle unfolds differentially across this highly variegated terrain and that the drive for socialism must take these geographical realities into account. But, secondly, it is equally important to problematize the actual account ('sketch' might be a more appropriate word) given in the *Manifesto* in order to develop a more sophisticated,

accurate and politically useful understanding as to how the geographical dimensions to capital accumulation and class struggle play such a fundamental role in the perpetuation of bourgeois power and the suppression of worker rights and aspirations not only in particular places but also globally.

In what follows, I shall largely take the first response as a 'given' even though I am only too aware that it needs again and again to be reasserted within a movement that has not by any means taken on board some, let alone all, of its very basic implications. While Lefebvre perhaps exaggerates a touch, I think it worth recalling his remark that capitalism has survived in the twentieth century by one and only one means: 'by occupying space, by producing space' (Lefebvre 1976). How ironic if the same were to be said at the end of the twenty-first century!

My main concern here, then, is to problematize the account given in the *Manifesto*. This requires, tacitly or explicitly, a non-Hegelian counter-theory of the spatio-temporal development of capital accumulation and class struggle (Meszaros 1995; Harvey 1996). From such a perspective, I shall isolate six aspects of the *Manifesto* for critical commentary.

First, the division of the world into 'civilized' and 'barbarian' nations is, to say the least, anachronistic if not downright objectionable even if it can be excused as typical of the times. Furthermore, the centre-periphery model of capital accumulation which accompanies it is at best a gross oversimplification and at worst misleading. It makes it appear as if capital originated in one place (England or Europe) and then diffused outwards to encompass the rest of the world. Adoption of this stance seems to derive from uncritical acceptance of Hegels' teleology – if space is to be considered at all, it is as a passive recipient of a teleological process that starts from the centre and flows outwards to fill up the entire globe. Leaving aside the whole problem of where, exactly, capitalism was born and whether it arose in one and only one place or was simultaneously emerging in geographically distinctive environments (an arena of scholarly dispute that shows no sign of coming to a consensus) the subsequent development of a capitalism that had, by the end of the eighteenth century at least, come to concentrate its freest forms of development in Europe in general and Britain in particular, cannot be encompassed by such a diffusionist way of thinking. While there are some instances in which capital diffused outwards from a centre to a periphery (for example the export of surplus capital from Europe to Argentina or Australia in the late nineteenth century), such an account is inconsistent with what happened in Japan after the Meiji restoration or what is happening today as first South Korea and then China engages in some form of internalized primitive accumulation and inserts its labor power and its products into global markets.



The geography of capital accumulation deserves a far more principled treatment than the diffusionist sketch provided in the *Manifesto*. The problem does not lie in the sketchiness of the account per se, but in the failure to delineate a theory of uneven geographical development (often entailing uneven primitive accumulation) that would be helpful for charting the dynamics of working-class formation and class struggle across even the European, let alone the global, space. I would also argue for a more fully theorized understanding of the space/place dialectic in capitalist development (Harvey 1996). How do places, regions, territories evolve given changing space relations? We have observed how geopolitical games of power, for example, become interconnected with market position in a changing structure of space-relations which, in turn, privileges certain locations and territories for capitalist accumulation. It is also interesting to note how those national bourgeoisies that could not easily use spatial powers to circumvent feudalism ended up with fascism (Germany, Italy, Spain are cases in point). Since these are rather abstract arguments, I shall try to put some flesh and bones on them in what follows.

To begin with, the globe never has been a level playing-field upon which capital accumulation could play out its destiny. It was, and continues to be, an intensely variegated surface, ecologically, politically, socially and culturally differentiated. Flows of capital found some terrains easier to occupy than others in different phases of development. And in the encounter with the capitalist world market, some social formations adapted to aggressively insert themselves into capitalistic forms of market exchange while others did not, for a wide range of reasons and with consummately important effects. Primitive or 'original' accumulation can, and has occurred, in different places and times, albeit facilitated by contact with the market network that increasingly pins the globe together into an economic unity. But how and where that primitive accumulation occurs depends upon local conditions even if the effects are global. It is now a widely held belief in Japan, for example, that the commercial success of that country after 1960 was in part due to the non-competitive and withdrawn stance of China after the revolution and that the contemporary insertion of Chinese power into the capitalist world market spells doom for Japan as a producer as opposed to a rentier economy. Contingency of this sort rather than teleology has a lot of play within capitalist world history. Furthermore, the globality of capital accumulation poses the problem of a dispersed bourgeois power that can become much harder to handle geopolitically precisely because of its multiple sites. Marx himself later worried about this political possibility. In 1858 he wrote (in a passage that Meszaros rightly makes much of (1996: xii)):

For us the difficult question is this: the revolution on the Continent is imminent and its character will be at once socialist; will it not be *necessarily crushed* in this *little corner of the world*, since on a much larger terrain the development of bourgeois society is still *in the ascendant*.

It is chastening to reflect upon the number of socialist revolutions around the world that have been successfully encircled and crushed by the geopolitical strategies of an ascendant bourgeois power.

Second, the *Manifesto* quite correctly highlights the importance of reducing spatial barriers through innovations and investments in transport and communications as critical to the growth and sustenance of bourgeois power. Moreover, the argument indicates that this is an ongoing rather than already-accomplished process. In this respect, the *Manifesto* is prescient in the extreme. 'The annihilation of space through time' as Marx later dubbed it (adopting an expression that was quite common in the early nineteenth century as people adjusted to the revolutionary implications of the railroad and the telegraph) is deeply embedded in the logic of capital accumulation, entailing as it does the continuous, though often jerky, transformations in space relations that have characterized the historical-geography of the bourgeois era (from turnpikes to cyberspace). These transformations undercut the absolute qualities of space (often associated with feudalism) and emphasize the relativity of space relations and locational advantages, thus making the Ricardian doctrine of comparative advantage in trade a highly dynamic rather than stable affair. Furthermore, spatial tracks of commodity flows have to be mapped in relation to flows of capital, labor power, military advantage, technology transfers, information flows, and the like. In this regard, at least, the *Manifesto* was not wrong as much as underelaborated upon and underappreciated for its prescient statements.

Third, perhaps one of the biggest absences in the *Manifesto* is its lack of attention to the territorial organization of the world in general and of capitalism in particular. If, for example, the state was necessary as an 'executive arm of the bourgeoisie', then the state had to be territorially defined, organized and administered. While the right of sovereign independent states to coexistence was established at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 as a (distinctively shaky) European norm, the general extension of that principle across the globe took several centuries to take shape and is even now arguably not accomplished. The nineteenth century was the great period of territorial definitions (with most of the world's boundaries being established between 1870 and 1925 and most of those being drawn by the British and the French alone, the carve-up of Africa in 1885 being the most spectacular example). But state formation and consolidation is

quite another step beyond territorial definition and it has proven a long-drawn-out and often unstable affair (particularly, for example, in Africa). It could well be argued that it was only after 1945 that decolonization pushed state formation worldwide a bit closer to the highly simplified model that the *Manifesto* envisages. Furthermore, the relativism introduced by revolutions in transport and communications coupled with the uneven dynamics of class struggle and uneven resource endowments means that territorial configurations cannot remain stable for long. Flows of commodities, capital, labour and information always render boundaries porous. There is plenty of play for contingency (including phases of territorial reorganization and redefinition) here, thus undermining the rather simplistic teleology that derives from Hegel but which can still be found in some versions of both capitalistic and communist ideas about what the future necessarily holds.

Fourth, the state is, of course, only one of many mediating institutions that influence the dynamics of accumulation and of class struggle worldwide. Money and finance must also be given pride of place. In this respect there are some intriguing questions about which the *Manifesto* remains silent, in part, I suspect, because its authors had yet to discover their fundamental insights about the dialectical relations between money, production, commodity exchange, distribution and production (as these are conceptualized, for example, in the Introduction to the *Grundrisse*). There are two ways to look at this (and I here take the question of money as both emblematic and fundamental). On the one hand, we can interpret world money as some universal representation of value to which territories relate (through their own currencies) and to which capitalist producers conform as they seek some measure of their performance and profitability. This is a very functionalist and undialectical view. It makes it seem as if value hovers as some ethereal abstraction over the activities of individuals as of nations (this is, incidentally, the dominant conception at work in the contemporary neoclassical ideology of globalization). In *Capital*, Marx looks upon world money differently, as a representation of value that arises out of a dialectical relation between the particularity of material activities (concrete labor) undertaken in particular places and times and the universality of values (abstract labor) achieved as commodity exchange becomes so widespread and generalized as to be a normal social act. But institutions mediate between particularity and universality so as to give some semblance of order and permanence to what is otherwise shifting sand. Central banks, financial institutions, exchange systems, state-backed local currencies and so on then become powerful mediators between the universality of money on the world market and the particularities of concrete labors conducted here and now around us. Such mediating insti-

tutions are also subject to change as, for example, powers shift from yen to deutschmarks to dollars and back again or as new institutions (like the IMF and the World Bank after 1945) spring up to take on new mediating roles. The point here is that there is always a problematic relation between local and particular conditions on the one hand and the universality of values achieved on the world market on the other, and that this internal relation is mediated by institutional structures which themselves acquire a certain kind of independent power. These mediating institutions are often territorially based and biased in important ways. They play a key role in determining what kinds of concrete labors and what kinds of class relations shall arise where and can sometimes even dictate patterns of uneven geographical development through their command over capital assembly and capital flows. Given the importance of European-wide banking and finance in the 1840s (the Rothschilds being prominent players in the events of 1848, for example) and the political-economic theories of the Saint-Simonians with respect to the power of associated capitals to change the world, the absence of any analysis of the mediating institutions of money and finance is surprising. Subsequent formulations (not only by Marx but also by Lenin, Hilferding and many others) may have helped to rectify matters, but the rather episodic and contingent treatment of the role of finance and money capital in organizing the geographical dynamics of capital accumulation may have been one of the *Manifesto's* unwitting legacies (hardly anything was written on the topic between Hilferding and the early 1970s).

Fifth, the argument that the bourgeois revolution subjugated the countryside to the city as it similarly subjugated territories in a lesser state of development to those in a more advanced state, that processes of industrialization and rapid urbanization laid the seedbed for a more united working-class politics, is again prescient in the extreme at least in one sense. Reduced to its simplest formulation, it says that the production of spatial organization is not neutral with respect to class struggle. And that is a vital principle no matter how critical we might be with respect to the sketch of these dynamics as laid out in the *Manifesto*. The account offered runs like this:

The proletariat goes through various stages of development. With its birth begins its struggle with the bourgeoisie. At first the contest is carried on by individual labourers, then by the workpeople of a factory, then by the operatives of one trade, in one locality, against the individual bourgeois who directly exploits them. At this stage the labourers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the country, and broken up by their mutual competition. If anywhere they unite to form more compact bodies this is

not yet the consequence of their own active union but of the union of the bourgeoisie . . . But with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more . . . the collisions between individual workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two classes. Thereupon the workers begin to form combinations (trades unions) . . . This union (of the workers) is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralise the numerous local struggles, all of the same character into one national struggle between classes . . .

For much of the nineteenth century, this account captures a common enough path to the development of class struggle. And there are plenty of of twentieth-century examples where similar trajectories can be discerned (the industrialization of South Korea being paradigmatic). But it is one thing to say that this is a useful descriptive sketch and quite another to argue that these are necessary stages through which class struggle must evolve en route to the construction of socialism. But if it is interpreted, as I have suggested, as a compelling statement of the non-neutrality of spatial organization in the dynamics of class struggle, then it follows that the bourgeoisie may also evolve its own spatial strategies of dispersal, of divide and rule, of geographical disruptions to the rise of class forces that so clearly threaten its existence. To the passages already cited, we find added the cautionary statement that: 'this organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the worker's themselves.' And there are plenty of examples of bourgeois strategies to achieve that effect. From the dispersal of manufacturing from centres to suburbs in late nineteenth-century US cities to avoid concentrated proletarian power to the current attack on union power by dispersal and fragmentation of production processes across space (much of it, of course, to so-called developing countries where working-class organization is weakest) has proven a powerful weapon in the bourgeois struggle to enhance its power. The active stimulation of inter-worker competition across space has likewise worked to capitalist advantage, to say nothing of the problem of localism and nationalism within working-class movements (the position of the Second International in the First World War being the most spectacular case). In general, I think it fair to say that workers' movements have been better at commanding power in places and territories rather than in controlling spatialities, with the result that the capitalist class has used its superior powers of spatial manoeuvre to defeat place-bound pro-

letarian/socialist revolutions (see Marx's 1858 worry cited above). The recent geographical and ideological assault on working-class forms of power through 'globalization' gives strong support to this thesis. While none of this is inconsistent with the basic underpinning of the argument in the *Manifesto*, it is, of course, quite different from the actual sketch of class-struggle dynamics set out as a stage model for the development of socialism in the European context.

Sixth, this leads us to one of the most problematic elements in the *Manifesto's* legacy. This concerns the homogenization of the 'working man' and of 'labor powers' across a highly variegated geographical terrain as the proper basis for struggles against the powers of capital. While the slogan 'working men of all countries unite' may still stand (suitably modified to rid it of its gendered presupposition) as the only appropriate response to the globalizing strategies of capital accumulation, the manner of arriving at and conceptualizing that response deserves critical scrutiny. Central to the argument lies the belief that modern industry and wage labor, imposed by the capitalists ('the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany'), have stripped the workers 'of every trace of national character'. As a result:

The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat.

In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.

The guiding vision is noble enough but there is unquestionably a lot of wishful thinking here. At best, the *Manifesto* mildly concedes that the initial measures to be taken as socialists come to power will 'of course be different in different countries'. It also notes how problems arise in the translation of political ideas from one context to another – the Germans took on French ideas and adapted them to their own circumstances which

were not so well-developed, creating a German kind of socialism of which Marx was highly critical in Part III of the *Manifesto*. In the practical world of politics, then, there is a certain sensitivity to uneven material conditions and local circumstances. And in the final section of the *Manifesto*, attention is paid to the different political conditions in France, Switzerland, Poland and Germany. From this Marx and Engels divine that the task of communists is to bring unity to these causes, to define the commonalities within the differences and to make a movement in which workers of the world can unite. But in so doing, the force of capital that uproots and destroys local place-bound loyalties and bonds is heavily relied upon to prepare the way.

There are I think two ways in which we can read this. On the one hand, the *Manifesto* insists, quite correctly in my view, that the only way to resist capitalism and transform towards socialism is through a global struggle in which global working-class formation, perhaps achieved in a step-wise fashion from local to national to global concerns acquires sufficient power and presence to fulfill its own historical potentialities.<sup>4</sup> In this case, the task of the communist movement is to find ways, against all odds, to properly bring together all the various highly differentiated and often local movements into some kind of commonality of purpose. The second reading is rather more mechanistic. It sees the automatic sweeping-away of national differences and differentiations through bourgeois advancement, the delocalization and denationalization of working-class populations and therefore of their political aspirations and movements. The task of the communist movement is to prepare for and hasten on the endpoint of this bourgeois revolution, to educate the working class as to the true nature of their situation and to organize, on that basis, their revolutionary potential to construct an alternative. Such a mechanistic reading is, in my view, incorrect even though substantial grounding for it can be found within the *Manifesto* itself.

The central difficulty lies in the presumption that capitalist industry and commodification will lead to homogenization of the working population. There is, of course, an undeniable sense in which this is true, but what it fails to appreciate is the way in which capitalism simultaneously differentiates, sometimes feeding off ancient cultural distinctions, gender relations, ethnic predilections and religious beliefs. It does this not only through the development of explicit bourgeois strategies of divide and control, but also by converting the principle of market choice into a mechanism for group differentiation. The result is the implantation of all

<sup>4</sup> I have elsewhere tried to adapt Raymond Williams concept of 'militant particularism' to capture this process and its inevitable contradictions: see Harvey 1996: ch. 1.

manner of class, gender and other social divisions into the geographical landscape of capitalism. Divisions such as those between cities and suburbs, between regions as well as between nations cannot be understood as residuals from some ancient order. They are not automatically swept away. They are actively produced through the differentiating powers of capital accumulation and market structures. Place-bound loyalties proliferate and in some respects strengthen rather than disintegrate through the mechanisms of class struggle as well as through the agency of both capital and labor working for themselves. Class struggle all too easily dissolves into a whole series of geographically fragmented communitarian interests, easily co-opted by bourgeois powers or exploited by the mechanisms of neo-liberal market penetration.

There is a potentially dangerous underestimation within the *Manifesto* of the powers of capital to fragment, divide and differentiate, to absorb, transform and even exacerbate ancient cultural divisions, to produce spatial differentiations, to mobilize geopolitically, within the overall homogenization achieved through wage labor and market exchange. And there is likewise an underestimation of the ways in which labor mobilizes through territorial forms of organization, building place-bound loyalties en route. The dialectic of commonality and difference has not worked out (if it ever could) in the way that the sketch supplied in the *Manifesto* implied, even if its underlying logic and its injunction to unite is correct.

### ‘Working men of all countries, unite!’

The World Bank estimates that the global labor force doubled in size between 1966 and 1995 (it now stands at an estimated 2.5 billion men and women). But:

the more than a billion individuals living on a dollar or less a day depend . . . on pitifully low returns to hard work. In many countries workers lack representation and work in unhealthy, dangerous, or demeaning conditions. Meanwhile 120 millions or so are unemployed worldwide and millions more have given up hope of finding work.

(World Bank 1995: 9)

This condition exists at a time of rapid growth in average levels of productivity per worker (reported also to have doubled since 1965 worldwide) and a rapid growth in world trade fuelled in part by reductions in costs of movement but also by a wave of trade liberalization and sharp increases in the international flows of direct investments. The latter helped construct transnationally integrated production systems largely organized through intra-firm trade. As a result:



the number of workers employed in export- and import-competing industries has grown significantly. In this sense, therefore, it could be said that labour markets across the world are becoming more interlinked . . . Some observers see in these developments the emergence of a global labour market wherein 'the world has become a huge bazaar with nations peddling their workforces in competition against one another, offering the lowest prices for doing business' . . . The core apprehension is that intensifying global competition will generate pressures to lower wages and labour standards across the world.

(International Labour Office 1996: 2)

This process of ever-stronger interlinkage has been intensified by 'the increasing participation in the world economy of populous developing countries such as China, India and Indonesia.' With respect to China, for example, the United Nations Development Programme reports:

The share of labour-intensive manufactures in total exports rose from 36% in 1975 to 74% in 1990 . . . Between 1985 and 1993 employment in textiles increased by 20%, in clothing and fibre products by 43%, in plastic products by 51%. China is now a major exporter of labour-intensive products to many industrial countries . . . For all its dynamic job creation, China still faces a formidable employment challenge. Economic reforms have released a 'floating population' of around 80 million most of whom are seeking work. The State Planning Commission estimates that some 20 million workers will be shed from state enterprises over the next five years and that 120 million more will leave rural areas hoping for work in the cities. Labour intensive economic growth will need to continue at a rapid pace if all these people are to find work.

(United Nations Development Program 1996: 94)

I quote this instance to illustrate the massive movements into the global labor force that have been and are underway. And China is not alone in this. The export-oriented garment industry of Bangladesh hardly existed twenty years ago, but it now employs more than a million workers (80 per cent of them women and half of them crowded into Dhaka). Cities like Jakarta, Bangkok and Bombay, as Seabrook reports, have become meccas for formation of a transnational working class, heavily dependent upon women, under conditions of poverty, violence, pollution and fierce repression (Seabrook 1996: ch. 6).

It is hardly surprising that the insertion of this proletarianized mass into global trading networks has been associated with wide-ranging social convulsions and upheavals as well as changing structural conditions, such as the spiralling inequalities between regions (that left sub-Saharan Africa far behind as East and Southeast Asia surged ahead) as well as between

classes. As regards the latter, 'between 1960 and 1991 the share of the richest 20 per cent rose from 70 per cent of global income to 85 per cent – while that of the poorest declined from 2.3 per cent to 1.4 per cent'. By 1991, 'more than 85 per cent of the world's population received only 15 per cent of its income' and 'the net worth of the 358 richest people, the dollar billionaires, is equal to the combined income of the poorest 45 per cent of the world population – 2.3 billion people' (UN Development Program 1996: 13). This polarization is simply astounding, rendering hollow the World Bank's extraordinary claim that international integration coupled with free-market liberalism and low levels of government interference (conditions oddly and quite erroneously attributed to repressive political regimes in Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore) is the best way to deliver growth and rising living standards for workers (World Bank 1996: 3).

It is against this background that it becomes easier to assess the power of the tales assembled by Seabrook:

Indonesia, in the name of the free market system, promotes the grossest violations of human rights, and undermines the right to subsist of those on whose labour its competitive advantage rests. The small and medium-sized units which subcontract to the multinationals are the precise localities where the sound of the hammering, tapping, beating of metal comes from the forges where the chains are made for industrial bondage . . .

Many transnationals are subcontracting here: Levi Strauss, Nike, Reebok. A lot of the subcontractors are Korean-owned. They all tend to low wages and brutal management. Nike and Levis issue a code of conduct as to criteria for investment; but in reality, under the tender system they always go for the lowest cost of production . . . Some subcontractors move out of Jakarta to smaller towns, where workers are even less capable of combining to improve their conditions.

(Seabrook 1996: 103–5)

Or, at a more personal level there is the account given by a woman worker and her sister:

We are regularly insulted as a matter of course. When the boss gets angry he calls the women dogs, pigs, sluts, all of which we have to endure patiently without reacting . . . We work officially from seven in the morning until three (salary less than \$2 per day), but there is often compulsory overtime, sometimes – especially if there is an urgent order to be delivered – until nine. However tired we are, we are not allowed to go home. We may get an extra 200 rupiah (10 US cents) . . . We go on foot to the factory from where we live. Inside it is very hot. The building has a metal roof, and there is not much space for all the workers. It is very cramped. There are over 200 people working there, mostly women, but there is only one toilet for the

whole factory . . . when we come home from work, we have no energy left to do anything but eat and sleep.

(Seabrook 1996)

Home is a single room, two metres by three, costing \$16 a month; it costs nearly 10 cents to get two cans of water and at least a \$1.50 a day to eat.

In *Capital* Marx recounts the story of the milliner, Mary Anne Walkley, twenty years of age, who often worked thirty hours without a break (though revived by occasional supplies of sherry, port and coffee) until, after a particularly hard spell necessitated by preparing 'magnificent dresses for the noble ladies invited to the ball in honour of the newly imported Princess of Wales,' died, according to the doctor's testimony, 'from long hours of work in an over-crowded work-room, and a too small and badly ventilated bedroom.' Compare that with a contemporary account of conditions of labour in Nike plants in Vietnam:

(Mr Nguyen) found that the treatment of workers by the factory managers in Vietnam (usually Korean or Taiwanese nationals) is a 'constant source of humiliation,' that verbal abuse and sexual harassment occur frequently, and that 'corporal punishment' is often used. He found that extreme amounts of forced overtime are imposed on Vietnamese workers. 'It is a common occurrence,' Mr Nguyen wrote in his report, 'to have several workers faint from exhaustion, heat and poor nutrition during their shifts.' We were told that several workers even coughed up blood before fainting. Rather than crack down on the abusive conditions in the factories, Nike has resorted to an elaborate international public relations campaign to give the appearance that it cares about its workers. But no amount of public relations will change the fact that a full-time worker who makes \$1.60 a day is likely to spend a fair amount of time hungry if three very simple meals cost \$2.10.

(Herbert 1997)

The material conditions that sparked the moral outrage that suffuses the *Manifesto* have not gone away. They are embodied in everything from Nike shoes, Disney products, Gap clothing to Liz Claiborne products. And, as in the nineteenth century, part of the response has been reformist middle-class outrage backed by the power of working-class movements to regulate 'sweatshop labor' worldwide and develop a code of 'fair labor practices' perhaps certified by a 'fair labor label' on the products we buy (Goodman 1996; Greenhouse 1997a; 1997b).

The setting for the *Manifesto* has not, then, radically changed at its basis. The global proletariat is far larger than ever and the imperative for workers of the world to unite is greater than ever. But the barriers to that unity are far more formidable than they were in the already complicated

European context of 1848. The workforce is now far more geographically dispersed, culturally heterogeneous, ethnically and religiously diverse, racially stratified, and linguistically fragmented. The effect is to radically differentiate both the modes of resistance to capitalism and the definitions of alternatives. And while it is true that means of communication and opportunities for translation have greatly improved, this has little meaning for the billion or so workers living on less than a dollar a day possessed of quite different cultural histories, literatures and understandings (compared to international financiers and transnationals who use them all the time). Differentials (both geographical and social) in wages and social provision within the global working class are likewise greater than they have ever been. The political and economic gap between the most affluent workers in, say Germany and the US, and the poorest wage workers in Indonesia and Mali, is far greater than between the so-called aristocracy of European labour and their unskilled counterparts in the nineteenth century. This means that a certain segment of the working class (mostly but not exclusively in the advanced capitalist countries and often possessing by far the most powerful political voice) has a great deal to lose besides its chains. And while women were always an important component of the workforce in the early years of capitalist development, their participation has become much more general at the same time as it has become concentrated in certain occupational categories (usually dubbed 'unskilled') in ways that pose acute questions of gender in working-class politics that have too often been pushed under the rug in the past.

Ecological variations and their associated impacts (resource wars, environmental injustice, differential effects of environmental degradation) have also become far more salient in the quest for an adequate quality of life as well as for rudimentary healthcare. In this regard, too there is no level playing-field upon which class struggle can be evenly played out because the relation to nature is itself a cultural determination that can have implications for how any alternative to capitalism can be constructed at the same time as it provides a basis for a radical critique of the purely utilitarian and instrumental attitudes embedded in capitalist accumulation and exploitation of the natural world. How to configure the environmental with the economic, the political with the cultural, becomes much harder at the global level, where the presumption of homogeneity of values and aspirations across the earth simply does not hold.

Global populations have also been on the move. The flood of migratory movements seems impossible to stop. State boundaries are less porous for people and for labor than they are for capital, but they are still porous enough. Immigration is a very significant issue worldwide (including within the labor movement itself). Organizing labor in the face of the

considerable ethnic, racial, religious and cultural diversity generated out of migratory movements poses particular problems that the socialist movement has never found easy to address let alone solve. Europe, for example, now has to face all of those difficulties that have been wrestled with for so many years in the US.

Urbanization has also accelerated to create a major ecological, political, economic and social revolution in the spatial organization of the world's population. The proportion of an increasing global population living in cities has doubled in thirty years, making for massive spatial concentrations of population on a scale hitherto regarded as inconceivable. It has proven far easier to organize class struggle in, say, the small-scale mining villages of the South Wales coalfield, or even in relatively homogeneous industrial cities like nineteenth-century Manchester (with a population of less than a million, albeit problematically divided between English and Irish laborers), than organizing class struggle (or even developing the institutions of a representative democracy) in contemporary Sao Paulo, Cairo, Lagos, Los Angeles, Shanghai, Bombay, and the like, with their teeming, sprawling and often disjointed populations reaching close to or over the twenty-million mark.

The socialist movement has to come to terms with these extraordinary geographical transformations and develop tactics to deal with them. This does not dilute the importance of the final rallying cry of the *Manifesto* to unite. The conditions that we now face make that call more imperative than ever. But we cannot make either our history or our geography under historical-geographical conditions of our own choosing. A geographical reading of the *Manifesto* emphasizes the non-neutrality of spatial structures and powers in the intricate spatial dynamics of class struggle. It reveals how the bourgeoisie acquired its powers *vis-à-vis* all preceding modes of production by mobilizing command over space as a productive force peculiar to itself. It shows how the bourgeoisie has continuously enhanced and protected its power by that same mechanism. It therefore follows that until the working-class movement learns how to confront that bourgeois power to command and produce space, it will always play from a position of weakness rather than of strength. Likewise, until that movement comes to terms with the geographical conditions and diversities of its own existence, it will be unable to define, articulate and struggle for a realistic socialist alternative to capitalist domination.

The implications of such an argument are legion and some clues as to strategies are already embedded in the *Manifesto*. Properly embellished, they can take us onto richer terrains of struggle. It is important to accept, for example, that the beginning point of class struggle lies with the particularity of the laboring body, with figures like Mary Anne Walkley and

the billions of others whose daily existence is shaped through an often traumatic and conflictual relation to the dynamics of capital accumulation. The laboring body is, therefore, a site of resistance that achieves a political dimension through the political capacity of individuals to act as moral agents. To treat of matters this way is not to revert to some rampant individualism but to insist, as the *Manifesto* does, that the universality of class struggle originates with the particularity of the person and that class politics must translate back to that person in meaningful ways. The alienation of the individual is, therefore, an important beginning point for politics and it is that alienation that must be overcome.

But, and this is of course the crucial message of the *Manifesto*, that alienation cannot be addressed except through collective struggle and that means building a movement that reaches out across space and time in such a way as to confront the universal and transnational qualities of capital accumulation. Ways have to be found to connect the microspace of the body with the macrospace of what is now called 'globalization'. The *Manifesto* suggests this can be done by linking the personal to the local to the regional, the national, and ultimately the international. A hierarchy of spatial scales exists at which class politics must be constructed. But the 'theory of the production of geographical scale,' as Smith observes, 'is grossly underdeveloped' and we have yet to learn, particularly with respect to global working-class formation and body politics, how to 'arbitrate and translate' between the different spatial scales (Smith 1992). This is an acute problem that must be confronted and resolved if working-class politics is to be revived. I give just three examples.

The traditional beginning point for class struggle has been a particular space – the factory – and it is from there that class organization has been built up through union movements, political parties, and the like. But what happens when factories disappear or become so mobile as to make permanent organizing difficult if not impossible? And what happens when much of the workforce becomes temporary or casualized? Under such conditions, labor-organizing in the traditional manner loses its geographical basis and its power is correspondingly diminished. Alternative models of organizing must then be constructed. In Baltimore, for example, the campaign for a living wage (put together under the aegis of an organization called Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development – BUILD) appeals to an alternative possible strategy that works at the metropolitan scale – the movement is city-wide – and has as its objective directly affecting the base wage-level for the whole metropolitan area: everyone (temporary as well as permanent workers) should receive a living wage of at least \$7.70 an hour plus benefits. To accomplish this goal, institutions of community (particularly the churches), activist organizations, student

groups, as well as whatever union support can be procured, combine together with the aim of unionizing temporary workers and those on workfare, targeting the immovable institutions in the metropolitan space (government, including sub-contracting, universities, hospitals, and the like). A movement is created in the metropolitan space that operates outside of traditional labor-organizing models but in a way that addresses new conditions.<sup>5</sup> The BUILD strategy of inserting a metropolitan-scale politics into the equations of class struggle is an interesting example of shifting a sense of spatial scale to counteract the spatial tactics which capital uses.

Consider a second example. Governmentality for contemporary capitalism has entailed the construction of important supranational authorities such as NAFTA and the European Union. Unquestionably, such constructions – the Maastricht Agreement being the paradigmatic case – are pro-capitalist. How should the left respond? The divisions here are important to analyze (in Europe the debate within the left is intense), but too frequently the response is an overly simplistic argument that runs along the following lines: ‘because NAFTA and Maastricht are pro-capitalist we fight them by defending the nation state against supranational governance.’ The argument here outlined suggests an entirely different response. The left must learn to fight capital at *both* spatial scales simultaneously. But, in so doing, it must also learn to coordinate potentially contradictory politics within itself at the different spatial scales, for it is often the case in hierarchical spatial systems (and ecological problems frequently pose this dilemma) that what makes good political sense at one scale does not make such good politics at another (the rationalization of, say, automobile production in Europe may mean plant closures in Oxford or Turin). Withdrawing to the nation-state as the exclusive strategic site of class organization and struggle is to court failure (as well as to flirt with nationalism and all that that entails). This does not mean the nation-state has become irrelevant; indeed it has become more relevant than ever. But the choice of spatial scale is not ‘either/or’ but ‘both/and’ even though the latter entails confronting serious contradictions. This means that the union movement in the US ought to put just as much effort into cross-border organizing (particularly with respect to Mexico) as it puts into fighting NAFTA, and that the European union movement must pay as much attention to procuring power and influence in Brussels and Strasbourg as each does in its own national capital.

Moving to the international level poses similar dilemmas and problems. It is interesting to note that the internationalism of labor struggle,

<sup>5</sup> For accounts of the work of BUILD, see Cooper (1997) and Harvey (1998).

while it hovers as an obvious and latent necessity over much of the labor movement, faces serious difficulties organizationally. I again, in part, attribute this to a failure to confront the dilemmas of integrating struggles at different spatial scales. Examples exist of such integrations in other realms. Movements around human rights, the environment and the condition of women illustrate the possible ways in which politics can get constructed (as well as some of the pitfalls to such politics) to bridge the micro-scale of the body and the personal on the one hand and the macro-scale of the global and the political-economic on the other. Nothing analogous to the Rio Conference on the environment or the Beijing Conference on women has occurred to confront global conditions of labor. We have scarcely begun to think of concepts such as ‘global working-class formation’ or even to analyse what that might mean. Much of the defence of human dignity in the face of the degradation and violence of labor worldwide has been articulated through the churches rather than through labor organization directly (the churches’ ability to work at different spatial scales provides a number of models for political organization from which the socialist movement could well draw some important lessons). As in the case of BUILD at the local level, alliances between labor organizations and many other institutions in civil society appear now to be crucial to the articulation of socialist politics at the international scale. Many of the campaigns orchestrated in the US, for example, against global sweatshops in general or particular versions (such as Disney operations in Haiti and Nike in Southeast Asia) are organized quite effectively through such alliances. The argument here is not that nothing is being done or that institutions do not exist (the revitalization of the ILO might be an interesting place to start). But the reconstruction of some sort of socialist internationalism after 1989 has not been an easy matter, even if the collapse of the wall opened up new opportunities to explore that internationalism free of the need to defend the rump-end of the Bolshevik Revolution against the predatory politics of capitalist powers.<sup>6</sup>

How to build a political movement at a variety of spatial scales as an answer to the geographical and geopolitical strategies of capital is a problem that in outline at least the *Manifesto* clearly articulates. How to do it for our times is an imperative issue for us to resolve for our time and place. One thing, however, is clear: we cannot set about that task without recognizing the geographical complexities that confront us. The clarifications that a study of the *Manifesto*’s geography offer provide a

<sup>6</sup> *The Socialist Register* for 1994 examines many of these problems at length and the different contributions collectively reflect much of the complexity – both theoretical and practical – of constructing a new internationalist politics.



marvellous opportunity to wrestle with that task in such a way as to reignite the flame of socialism from Jakarta to Los Angeles, from Shanghai to New York City, from Porto Allegre to Liverpool, from Cairo to Warsaw, from Beijing to Turin. There is no magic answer. But there is at least a strategic way of thinking available to us that can illuminate the way. And that is what the *Manifesto* can still provide.